A report from the Russian service of the BBC, the prestigious British broadcaster, provides a very objective account of one of the most enigmatic and politically revealing episodes in the relationship between Angola and Russia.

On July 28, 2025, Luanda experienced its most violent day since the end of the civil war: a taxi drivers’ strike against rising fuel prices degenerated into a wave of protests that blocked roads, clashed with security forces, and ended with 29 dead and over 1,200 arrests.

This event led to the arrest of two Russian citizens—Igor Ratchin, identified as a tourist from Ryazan, and Lev Lakshtanov, a veteran translator—whose presence at the epicenter of the social upheaval immediately raised suspicions.

What might have seemed like a misunderstanding or a geographical coincidence turned out, according to the Angolan authorities’ investigation, to be the visible face of Angola’s strategic realignment toward the transatlantic axis and of the João Lourenço government’s growing intolerance of Russian interference in its new diplomatic and economic course.

The Angolan Prosecutor’s Office charges the Russians with 11 serious crimes, including espionage, active bribery of officials, and organizing a terrorist group.

The trial is scheduled for March 24, 2026, and promises to become a landmark in Angolan justice.

The prosecution maintains that both were part of a digital disinformation scheme aimed at inciting chaos by fabricating and disseminating fake news, including alleged government orders for the “immediate neutralization” of protesters—an expression that, in the Angolan context, refers to summary executions.

Under Angolan law, the mere intent to harm national integrity and independence or to undermine state institutions is sufficient to constitute the crime of terrorism.

The figure of Igor Ratchin is particularly revealing of the sophistication—and eccentricity—of so-called Russian “political technology.”

Before arriving in Luanda, Ratchin had been a behind-the-scenes strategist for United Russia and was awarded in 2024 for the “Landing of Shamans and Lamas” campaign in Siberia, where he used spiritual leaders to mobilize voters in an unorthodox manner.

He was an expert in “mobilization mimicry,” a technique that involves having official agents pose as independent activists to circumvent popular rejection.

In Angola, this method is said to have been replicated through local intermediaries, such as sports journalist Amor Karlo Tomé and politician Oliveira Francisco, who reportedly served as the Angolan faces of an operation aimed at organizing protests and constructing a narrative of revolt under the guise of cultural activities associated with the future—and never-opened—“Russian Center.”

The Angolan investigation also exposed the “African Political Science” network, a project that survived the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023.

After the fall of the Wagner Group leader, influence operations came under the control of the SVR, Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.

The geopolitical irony is evident: formal Russian intelligence inherited the chaotic informality of Prigozhin’s psychological operations, integrating former mercenary consultants into state structures such as Rossotrudnichestvo.

The operation in Angola unfolded in two phases: the first, led by Olga Smirnova, who operated on the ground starting in July 2024; the second, under the command of Igor Ratchin, began in October of the same year.

The network also included well-known figures such as Maxim Shugaley and Samer Sueifan, specialists in influence operations who had previously been imprisoned in Libya and Chad.

This case comes at a time when Angola is undergoing a profound transition, moving away from its historical dependence on Moscow to consolidate its position within the Western sphere.

The former military relationship—which included $1 billion in arms contracts in 2013—has given way to Joe Biden’s historic visit and strengthened cooperation with the United States.

In the diamond sector, the Russian giant Alrosa was forced to divest its stake in the Catoca mine, which was transferred to Omani funds—a move symbolizing the pragmatic replacement of Russia with new partners. [Editor’s Note: We have since exposed this in Tribuna as a mere front operation. The Russians continue to attempt to control Catoca].

The Russian network is also said to have attempted to sabotage the Lobito Corridor, a Western-funded railway project, by creating a clone website with a deliberate typo—“coridor”—to spread false reports about alleged environmental damage.

The most intriguing aspect of this case, however, is the Kremlin’s absolute silence.

Unlike what happened in Chad, where Russian diplomatic intervention was swift and effective, in Angola Moscow has remained silent for over seven months.

According to sources close to the Russian diplomatic corps in Luanda, the logic is simple: these agents failed and have become a burden on official diplomacy. The silence thus serves as a political message: Russia does not grant immunity to its strategists when they compromise its interests or fail in destabilization operations.

The case of Ratchin and Lakshtanov is, therefore, more than just a police matter.

It is a warning to the network of Russian strategists who are still trying to replicate the methods of the Prigozhin era in Africa and a sign that Luanda is willing to impose clear limits on tools of digital manipulation and political mimicry.

The big question now is whether Russian influence will be able to survive on the continent solely through psychological operations and disinformation, or whether the real economy—in the form of railway infrastructure, diamond mining, and Western financing—has already definitively won the strategic battle in Angola.

With the trial scheduled for March 2026, the fate of the two Russians will be the ultimate barometer of this new era.