Pro-Russian activist Rafael Marques continues his work as a fake lawyer, trying to create a false impression in public opinion about the Russians’ case. The inconsistencies and legal errors remain, compounded by repetitions of previous articles. His efforts are tiresome.

The pro-Russian activist’s criticism of Case No. 3846/25-CE continues to be based on a selective reading of the case files and a restrictive interpretation of the criminal law concept of espionage, leading to conclusions that are not supported by Angolan law or the logic of the investigation phase.

The argument presented assumes that the indictment lacks minimum factuality and that the judge of guarantees would have converted allegations into evidence, but this assumption does not stand up to systematic legal analysis.

Firstly, the charge of espionage does not depend, at the investigation stage, on the full demonstration of the objective and subjective elements of the type.

What is required is the verification of sufficient evidence, under the terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to support the continuation of criminal proceedings. The criticism confuses the judgment of circumstantial probability—which is specific to the investigation—with the judgment of certainty required for conviction.

The decision of the judge of guarantees is not to assess evidence in the strict sense, but rather to assess whether the prosecution has the minimum elements to justify the continuation of the proceedings. The assertion that the magistrate “treated the accusation as evidence” is thus the result of a decontextualized reading of the jurisdictional function at this stage.

Secondly, the interpretation presented of Article 317 of the Angolan Penal Code ignores the legal, doctrinal, and jurisprudential evolution of the concept of “state secret.” The rule is not limited to protecting formally classified information; it also covers data, activities, contacts, methods, or structures whose disclosure could affect essential interests of the State, even if they are not labeled as secret.

It suffices to read Article 317, 4. “If the agent’s activity does not concern state secrets, but the collection of information nevertheless endangers state security, the penalty is imprisonment for 1 to 5 years.”

Contemporary criminal doctrine recognizes that espionage may focus on operational, behavioral, or strategic information that, although not classified, is likely to be used by foreign entities for harmful purposes.

By reducing the legal type to the obtaining of formally protected documents, the criticism adopts an outdated concept that is incompatible with the dynamic nature of modern hybrid threats.

Thirdly, the accusation is not limited to “conjecture.” The description of organizational structures, operational flows, functional links, and concerted actions constitutes relevant factual material in criminal proceedings. The existence of organizations such as Africa Org, Africa Politology, or Angola Politology—regardless of their legal status—is legally relevant if there is evidence that they function as platforms for coordinated action with potential impacts on national security. Criticism requires documentary evidence of the existence of these entities, when criminal law does not require such formalism: it is sufficient that there is evidence of organized action, even if informal, for the Public Prosecutor’s Office to charge participation in a structure intended for the commission of crimes against state security.

Fourthly, the claim that there is no act of collecting, transmitting, or obtaining sensitive information ignores the fact that the indictment describes behaviors, contacts, movements, assigned functions, and operational frameworks that may constitute preparatory acts of espionage.

Angolan criminal law, like that of many jurisdictions, allows for the punishment of preparatory acts when they are part of crimes against state security, given their particularly harmful nature.

The criticism is based on the assumption that only the typical consummation can substantiate the indictment, which does not correspond to the applicable legal regime.

Fifth, the argument invoking political or diplomatic inconsistencies on the part of the Angolan state is irrelevant to the criminal legal analysis.

The executive branch’s actions in international relations do not condition the autonomy of the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the independence of the courts.

The possible maintenance of military cooperation or the presence of foreign officials does not constitute a legal element capable of invalidating evidence gathered in criminal proceedings. Mixing foreign policy considerations with the dogmatic analysis of the type of espionage is a methodological error that compromises the validity of the criticism.

Finally, the accusation that the judge “legitimized abuses” lacks proof. The judge does not assess the veracity of the facts, but rather the legality of the procedural acts and the sufficiency of the evidence. The decision to admit the accusation does not amount to validating its veracity, but only to recognizing that there are elements that justify the continuation of the investigation and subsequent trial. By confusing these two aspects, the criticism distorts the constitutional function of the judge.

In summary, the challenge presented by the pro-Russian activist is based on a partial reading of the criminal case, a restrictive interpretation of the legal definition of espionage, and a confusion between political judgments and legal judgments.

We reaffirm: Rafael Marques speaks of what he does not know.