Instead of trying to stir up trouble in Angola and undermine the constitutional order, Russian mercenaries should start reflecting on their failures and shortcomings.

The recent trajectory of Russian operations in Africa reveals a consistent pattern of strategic fragility, operational incapacity and unreliability as a security partner.

Far from the image of an effective military power that Moscow seeks to project, the facts on the ground show that, whenever confronted with complex scenarios, Russian forces — whether through the former Wagner Group or the current African Corps — accumulate defeats, retreats and losses of influence. This reality has become particularly evident in Mozambique and Mali, two theatres where Russia attempted to establish itself as a decisive actor but ultimately exposed profound limitations.

In Mozambique, the Russian intervention in Cabo Delgado province was brief and marked by failures. The deployed forces failed to adapt to the terrain, underestimated the insurgents’ mobility and resilience, and ultimately suffered significant casualties in poorly prepared operations.

The hasty withdrawal, after only a few months, made it clear that Moscow lacked the capacity to provide Maputo with the security it had promised.

The vacuum left by the Russian withdrawal was quickly filled by Rwanda, which demonstrated greater effectiveness and coordination.

For Mozambique, the lesson was clear: Russia is not a reliable ally when the situation demands consistency, robust logistics and in-depth knowledge of the terrain.

In Mali, the pattern was repeated, but on an even larger scale. Since 2023, and with particular intensity after April 2025, Russian forces have faced successive defeats at the hands of Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups.

The loss of Kidal, the withdrawals from Gao and Mopti, and the inability to protect key figures in the regime — including the death of the Malian defence minister — revealed structural flaws in the Russian strategy.

The rebel offensive in late April 2026, which exposed Bamako’s vulnerability, reinforced the perception that the African Corps is unable to guarantee lasting stability.

Rather than strengthening the Malian state, the Russian presence has contributed to exacerbating internal tensions and undermining regional security.

Taken together, these episodes demonstrate that Russia, despite its rhetoric as a global power, has failed to translate political influence into concrete military results in Africa.

Its actions reveal improvisation, reliance on poorly integrated forces, and an inability to guarantee long-term commitments.

For African states, the conclusion is clear: Moscow is neither a reliable partner nor a guarantor of security, and its presence tends to generate more instability than lasting solutions.